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Abstract: We consider a model consisting of a monopolistic firm producing a 
certain good with pollution. This firm can adopt a cleaner technology within a finite 
time by incurring an investment cost decreasing exponentially with the adoption 
date. At each period of time, the firm is regulated by an emission tax which induces 
the socially optimal pollution and production levels, and a lump sum tax on profit. 
The firm is induced to adopt the cleaner technology at the socially optimal date by 
an appropriate innovation subsidy. In the incomplete information context, the firm 
has private information concerning the cost of acquiring the new technology. By an 
appropriate contract consisting of an adoption date and a R&D subsidy depending 
on the value of the innovation cost parameter announced by the firm, the regulator 
can induce the latter to reveal the true value of its private information in 
compensation of a socially costly intertemporal informational rent. However, the 
socially optimal adoption date of incomplete information is delayed with respect to 
the complete information one.    
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1. Introduction 
 
It is widely recognized that the development and diffusion of cleaner technologies 
is an essential strategy for achieving environmental quality goals. By considering 
identical firms in a competitive industry, Milliman and Prince (1989) have evaluated 
the incentive effects of five environmental policy instruments, which are direct 
controls, emission subsidies, emission taxes, free marketable permits, and auctioned 
marketable permits, to promote technological change in pollution control. They 
showed that, on a relative basis, emission taxes and auctioned permits provide the 
highest firm incentives to promote technological change. Jung, Krutilla and Boyd 
(1996) have extended this comparative approach to a heterogeneous industry. 
Stranlund (1997) considered public aid to encourage the adoption of superior 
emission-control technologies combined with monitoring. This strategy is interesting 
when monitoring is difficult because the sources of pollution are widely dispersed or 
when emissions are not easily measured as in non-point pollution problems. 
Technological aid reduces the direct enforcement effort necessary for firms to reach 
the compliance goal. Consequently, firms adopt better control technologies, which 
may serve to promote further innovative activity. Carraro and Topa (1991) and Dosi 
and Moretto (2000) have tried to study this question in a duopolistic industry by 
introducing asymmetric information.   
Dosi and Moretto (1997) have studied the regulation of a firm which can switch to 
a green technology by incurring an irreversible investment cost. This technological 
switch is expected to provide appropriable benefits surrounded, however, by a 
certain degree of uncertainty. To bridge the gap between the private and the policy-
maker’s desired timing of innovation, they recommended that the regulator should 
stimulate the innovation by subsidies and by reducing the uncertainty surrounding 
the profitability of the new technology through appropriate announcements. Farzin 
and Kort (2000) have studied the regulation of a competitive firm and examined the 
effect of a higher pollution tax rate on abatement investment, both under full 
certainty and when the timing or the size of the tax increase is uncertain. They 
showed the possibility that a higher pollution tax rate induces more pollution and 
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that a credible threat to accelerate the tax increase can lead to a more abatement 
investment. 
Our model differs from the previous literature by the fact that we study the 
regulation of a monopolistic firm which can adopt a cleaner technology in a finite 
time and may have private information about the cost of the new innovation. 
We consider a model consisting of a monopolistic firm producing a certain good 
with pollution. This firm can adopt a cleaner technology within a finite time by 
incurring an investment cost decreasing exponentially with the adoption date. Since 
the firm is a monopoly that pollutes the environment, it is regulated. We suppose 
that raising public funds is socially costly. At each period of time, the firm is 
regulated by an emission tax, which induces the socially optimal pollution and 
production levels, and a lump sum tax on profit. The firm can also be induced to 
adopt the cleaner technology at the socially optimal date by an appropriate subsidy. 
Because of the positive marginal social cost of public funds, the firm has a net profit 
equal to zero.  In the incomplete information context, the firm has private 
information concerning the cost of acquiring the new technology. By means of a 
contract consisting of an adoption date and a R&D subsidy depending on the value 
of the innovation cost parameter announced by the firm, the regulator can induce the 
latter to reveal the true value of the private information in compensation of an 
intertemporal informational rent. However, the socially optimal adoption date is 
delayed with respect to the complete information case.    
The paper has the following structure. In section 2, we introduce the model and 
treat the full information case. In section 3, we study the incomplete information case 
and, in section 4, we conclude. Finally, in an appendix, we give the proofs to some 
results.   
 
2. The complete information benchmark 
 
We consider a monopolistic firm producing a certain good in quantity q sold on 
the market at price p(q)=a-bq, a,b>0. 
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The consumption of this good gives a consumer surplus equal to 
2
0 2
)()()( qbqqpdzzpqCS
q =−= ∫ . 
The unit production cost is c>0 and the profit of the firm is Π(q)=p(q)q-cq. 
The emission per-unit of good produced is e>0 and the pollution emitted by the 
firm is E=eq, which causes damages to the environment equal to D=αE, where α>0 is 
the marginal disutility of pollution. 
At the beginning of the game i.e. at date 0, the firm uses an old production 
technology characterized by an emission/output ratio equal to K>0. The firm 
behaves for an infinite horizon of time and can adopt a new and cleaner production 
technology within a period of time τ, which is characterized by a lower 
emission/output ratio k verifying 0<k<K. The investment cost required could 
comprise the R&D cost and/or the cost of acquisition and installation of the new 
technology. Thus, we will use the terms innovation and adoption interchangeably.  
 We model the cost of adopting the cleaner technology at date τ actualized at date 
0 as: 
τθτ mreV −=)(                                                               (1) 
Where θ>0 is the cost of immediate adoption of the new technology, r>0 is the 
discount rate, and m>1 denotes that the cost of innovation decreases more rapidly as 
m is greater. 
Function V is decreasing because of the existence of freely-available scientific 
research allowing the firm to reduce the cost of innovation when it delays its 
adoption, and is convex as the innovation cost increases more rapidly when the firm 
tries to accelerate the adoption date. Let’s notice that τ=+∞ means that the firm never 
innovates. 
At each period of time, the firm is a monopoly that pollutes the environment and, 
therefore, should be regulated. The regulator proposes a contract (q, x), where q is 
the level of production and x is a monetary transfer from the regulator to the firm. 
We suppose that public funds are raised through distortionary taxation and we 
denote the marginal social cost of public funds by λ>0, which means that collecting 
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1$ from a firm costs λ$ to the regulator, or equivalently, giving 1$ to the firm costs to 
the regulator (1+λ)$.1     
Thus, the consumer welfare is CS(q)-D(q)-(1+λ)x, the net profit of the monopoly is 
U=Π(q)+x, and the social welfare W is equal to the consumer welfare plus the net 
profit, which can be written as W=S(q)-λU, where  
S=CS(q)-D(q)+(1+λ)Π(q)= 2
2
qb -αeq+(1+λ)[(a-bq)q-cq]                             (2) 
Under complete information, the regulator maximizes his social welfare with 
respect to q and U under the rationality constraint of the firm. We allow ourselves to 
express the regulator’s problem in function of U rather than x because these latter are 
one-to-one related. Since the reservation utility level of the firm is assumed to be 
equal to zero, the regulator chooses the monetary transfer so that the net profit of the 
firm is nil (U=0), then he chooses the production quantity that maximizes W or, 
equivalently, that maximizes S. 
The socially optimal production quantities when the firm uses the old and new 
technology are, respectively: 
b
Kcaqo )21(
))(1(
λ
αλ
+
−−+=       ,      
b
kcaqn )21(
))(1(
λ
αλ
+
−−+=                          (3) 
These production quantities are positive iff: 
(1+λ)(a-c)> αK                                                     (C.1) 
The cleaner technology enables to increase production. We can verify that on EE <  
iff (1+λ)(a-c)> α(k+K). Therefore, when the marginal disutility of pollution is low 
enough, the new technology enables to produce more while reducing pollution. 
However, when the marginal disutility of pollution is high enough, the new 
technology increases pollution. 
If direct quantitative regulation is not desired, at each period of time, the regulator 
can implement the socially optimal levels of production, pollution and social welfare 
by the following two instruments: a tax per-unit of pollution 
e
cabqt −+−= 2  and a 
lump sum tax on profit T=[p(q)-c-te]q>0, where q and e are, respectively, equal to oq  
and K, or to nq  and k. 
                                                        
1 See Ballard et al. (1985) and Laffont (1994) for more information on this subject. 
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To induce the firm adopting the cleaner technology at the socially optimal date, 
the regulator, at date 0, proposes a contract (τ, g) where τ is the adoption date and g 
is the value of the innovation subsidy actualized at date 0, which will be received by 
the firm at date τ. Let’s notice that the contract is signed at date 0, whereas the 
subsidy is received at date τ to prevent that the firm don’t respect the signed contract 
after having received the innovation subsidy. 
The intertemporal net profit of the firm at date 0 is IU=g-V(τ). 
The intertemporal social welfare of the regulator at date 0 is equal to the 
instantaneous social welfare actualized at date 0, minus the innovation subsidy 
given to the firm weighed by (1+λ), plus the intertemporal net profit of the firm: 
∫∫ +∞ −− += ττ dteSdteSIW rtnrto0 -(1+λ)g+IU 
The above expression can be written as: 
∫∫ +∞ −− += ττ dteSdteSIW rtnrto0 -(1+λ)V(τ)-λIU                             (4) 
Under complete information, the regulator sets the innovation subsidy so that the 
intertemporal net profit of the firm is nil. Therefore, the regulator reimburses to the 
firm all the cost of innovation i.e. g=V(τ). 
Thus, the intertemporal social welfare is: 
τ
τ
τ θλ mrrtnrto edteSdteSIW −+∞ −− +−+= ∫∫ )1(0                              (5)  
Maximizing the intertemporal social welfare given by (5) with respect to τ gives 
the socially optimal adoption date. 
In the appendix, we show that 0SSn >  meaning that the instantaneous social 
welfare is greater when the cleaner technology is used because innovation enables to 
produce more while polluting less when the marginal damage of pollution is low 
enough. Also, we derive the socially optimal adoption date of complete information: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−
−= mr
SS
rm
onC
s θλτ )1(ln)1(
1                                             (6) 
Expression (6) is positive iff: 
θλ <+
−
mr
SS on
)1(
                                                    (C.2) 
Therefore, the cost of immediate adoption (at date 0) is sufficiently high. This is 
why adoption is not immediate. What determine the socially optimal adoption date 
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are the instantaneous gain from innovation 00 >− SSn , and the cost of innovation 
which increases rapidly as adoption is accelerated. This comparison shows that the 
new technology is adopted within a finite and non nil time.  
The natural question at this stage is what is the optimal adoption date which will 
be chosen by the firm without any intervention of the regulator on the innovation 
activity of the latter? Since the instantaneous net profit of the firm is nil, adopting the 
new technology at any finite date τ gives it an intertemporal net profit negative and 
equal to –V(τ). Thus, without an intervention of the regulator on the innovating 
activity of the firm, the latter will never adopt the cleaner technology. 
 
3. The incomplete information case  
 
Now we suppose that the firm has a private information concerning its cost of 
adopting the cleaner technology: θ is a private information for the firm. However, 
the regulator knows that θ∈ [ ]θ θ,  with the probability density function θθθ −= 1)(f , 
and the uniform  distribution F. The regulation of a monopoly under incomplete 
information and costly public funds has been very well studied by Laffont and 
Tirole (1986). 
At each period of time, there are no informational asymmetries, and the firm is 
regulated as in the complete information benchmark because the lack of information 
of the regulator concerns the innovation abilities of the firm and does not concern its 
production abilities. 
At date 0, the regulator proposes a contract ))ˆ(),ˆ(( θθτ g  where θˆ  is the value of the 
private information announced by the firm, )ˆ(θτ  is the date at which it will adopt 
the new technology and )ˆ(θg  is the R&D subsidy, actualized at date 0, which will 
receive the firm from the regulator at date )ˆ(θτ . We suppose that the regulator 
cannot contract on any kind of ex post information. 
The instantaneous net profit of the firm is nil because there is no informational 
asymmetries. However, the intertemporal net profit of the firm is: 
))ˆ(,()ˆ()ˆ,( θτθθθθ VgIU −=  
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There is a temptation for the firm to announce a higher value than the true value of 
its private information in order to make the regulator believe that it has high 
innovation cost and, accordingly, receives a higher innovation subsidy. Therefore, 
the contract proposed by the regulator must provide incentives to the firm to reveal 
the true value of θ:  
{ } [ ]θθθθτθθθ
θ
,,))ˆ(,()ˆ(maxarg
ˆ
∈∀−∈ Vg  
The first order condition for the revelation problem is: 
[ ] 0))(,()(')('0))ˆ(,()ˆ(')ˆ(' ˆ =−⇔=− = θτθθτθθτθθτθ τθθτ VgVg                   (7) 
At the equilibrium, the intertemporal net profit of the firm is: 
))(,()()( θτθθθ VgIU −=  
Deriving with respect to θ the above expression, we get: 
))(,()('))(,()(')(' θτθθτθτθθθ τθ VVgIU −−=  
Using (7), the first order local condition becomes: 
))(,()(' θτθθ θVIU −=                                                    (8) 
The second order local condition is: 
0))(,())('())(,()('')('' 2 ≤−− θτθθτθτθθτθ τττ VVg  
Using (7), we get: 
[ ] 0))(,()('))(,())('())(,()('')('' 2 =−−− θτθθτθτθθτθτθθτθ θττττ VVVg  
The term between the above brackets is negative iff the other term is positive. The 
new second order local condition is: 
0))(,()(' ≤θτθθτ θτV                                                   (9) 
At the equilibrium, the intertemporal social welfare is: 
∫∫ +∞ −− += )()(0)),(),(( θτθτθθθτ dteSdteSgIW rtnrto -(1+λ)g(θ)+IU(θ) 
 The above expression can be written as: 
)),(()),(),(( θθτθθθτ ISgIW = -λIU(θ)                               (10) 
where 
∫∫ +∞ −− += )()(0)),(( θτθτθθτ dteSdteSIS rtnrto -(1+λ)V(θ,τ(θ))             (11) 
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The regulator maximizes the mathematical expectation of his intertemporal social 
welfare with respect to τ(θ) and IU(θ) under the revelation and rationality 
constraints of the firm. 
To simplify the optimization problem of the regulator, we replace the rationality 
constraint (IU(θ)≥0) by 0)( =θIU . This last equality seems logical since when the 
innovation parameter cost is equal to its higher value, the firm trying to overestimate 
its private information, cannot do it and, therefore, has no intertemporal 
informational rent. Moreover, we momentarily put aside the second order local 
condition. We come to the Bayesian differentiable equilibrium and we check ex post 
these ignored constraints as well as the positivity of the equilibrium adoption date 
and the global optimality of the revelation problem of the firm. 
Thus, the simplified optimization problem of the regulator is: 
( )
0)(
))(,()('
)()),(()(
(.)(.),
=
−=
−∫
θ
θτθθ
θθλθθτθ
θ
θ
θτ
IU
VIU
dIUISfMax
IU
                               (12) 
In the appendix, we derive the socially optimal adoption date of incomplete 
information: 
[ ] ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−++
−
−= mr
SS
rm
onI
s )()1(
ln
)1(
1)( θθλθλθτ                               (13) 
We can verify that )()( θτθτ CsIs >  meaning that asymmetric information postpones 
the adoption of the cleaner technology.  
From (8), we can calculate IU(θ), and then the innovation subsidy: 
)()()( θτ
θ
θ
τ θθ IsIs mrzmr edzeg −− += ∫  
From expression (7), we have ( ) ( ))(,')()(' θτθθτθ τ IsIs Vg = . From (13), we 
have ( ) 0)( ' >θτ Is , and since ))(,( θτθτV <0, then g’(θ)<0: the subsidy received by the 
firm decreases with θ and the adoption date is delayed. This is what induces the firm 
to tell the true value of its private information. 
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4. Conclusion                           
 
We study the regulation of a monopolistic firm which can adopt a cleaner 
production technology in a finite time and may have private information about the 
cost of the new innovation. We suppose the existence of positive marginal social cost 
of public funds. 
At each period of time, the firm is regulated by an emission tax which induces the 
socially optimal pollution and production levels, and a lump sum tax on profit. The 
firm can also be induced to adopt the cleaner technology at the socially optimal date 
by an appropriate innovation subsidy.  
Under incomplete information, by means of a contract consisting of an adoption 
date and a R&D subsidy depending on the value of the innovation cost parameter 
announced by the firm, the regulator can induce the latter to reveal the true value of 
its private information in compensation of an intertemporal informational rent. 
However, the socially optimal adoption date is delayed with respect to the complete 
information case.    
Our results can be extended to the case where the new technology is characterized 
by abatement possibilities and when abatement costs are not too high. Indeed, at 
each period of time, by using the new technology, pollution is lower and production 
is greater implying a social welfare improvement, which makes the adoption 
profitable. They can also be extended to the case where the new technology reduces 
the cost of production.  
Let’s notice that we deal with an infinite horizon of time thus avoiding too hard 
computations, but our results remain valid for a sufficiently long finite horizon.  
If we extend our model to the case of n identical firms competing in quantities, the 
equilibrium at each period of time is determined by the total production of firms. 
Consequently, to support only one investment cost, the regulator will choose only 
one firm producing and the other will be inactive. Thus, if we want to extend this 
work to an interesting oligopoly case, we can consider that the marginal cost of 
production is not constant. The incomplete information context of such an extension 
is trivial if the private information parameters are perfectly correlated among firms 
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because yardstick competition2 enables the regulator to extract the private 
information at no cost and implement the full information equilibrium. Thus, what is 
interesting is to consider that the R&D cost parameters are independently 
distributed.  
 
Appendix 
 
A) Proof of on SS >  
Expression (2) can be written as: 
qecabqS ]))(1[()21(
2
1 2 αλλ −−+++−=  
Thus, 
)()())(1()()21(
2
1
]))(1[(]))(1[()()21(
2
1 22
noonon
ononon
kqKqqqcaqqb
qKcaqkcaqqbSS
−+−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −++++−=
−−+−−−++−+−=−
αλλ
αλαλλ
 
By using the expressions of oq  and nq  given by (3), we get: 
0)(
2
)())((
2
>+−=−+−+=− onnoonon qqkKkqKqqqKkSS ααα  
Therefore, the instantaneous social welfare is greater when the monopoly uses the 
cleaner technology. 
 
B) Derivation of the socially optimal adoption date of complete information 
To get the socially optimal adoption date, the regulator maximizes his intertemporal 
social welfare function given by (5) with respect to τ: 
 0)1()( =++−=∂
∂ −− ττ θλτ
mrr
no mreeSS
IW                                (14) 
Equation (14) is equivalent to: 
⇔=++− − 0)1( )1( τθλ rmno mreSS ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−
−= mr
SS
rm
onC
s θλτ )1(ln)1(
1                      (15) 
Because of condition (C.2), 0>Csτ . 
                                                        
2 See Kwerel (1977) and Shleifer (1985). 
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We have: ττ θλτ
mrr
on emreSSr
IW −− +−−=∂
∂ 2
2
2
)()1()( . 
Using (14), we get: 
0)1()1(
)( 2
2
2
<−+=∂
∂ − CsmrCs ermmIW τθλτ
τ  
The second order condition of optimality is therefore verified. 
 
C) Derivation of the socially optimal adoption date of incomplete information 
The Hamiltonian of the simplified optimization problem of the regulator given by 
(12) is: 
),()(]),()[(),,( τθθρλθτθθτ θVIUISfIUH −−=                       (16) 
Where ρ(θ) is the multiplier of the incentive constraint. 
The necessary, and sufficient due to the concavity of the Hamiltonian, Kuhn and 
Tucker conditions are: 0=∂
∂
τ
H  and )()(' θλθρ f
IU
H =∂
∂−= . 
Since there is no transversality condition in θ , then θθ
θθλθλθρ −
−== )()( F . 
From (16):  
0)()( =−∂
∂=∂
∂
θτθρτθτ V
ISfH                                               (17) 
Using (1) and (11), we get: 
ττ θλτ
mrr
no mreeSS
IS −− ++−=∂
∂ )1()(                                        (18) 
Using (18) in (17) gives us the socially optimal adoption date of incomplete 
information: 
[ ] ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−++
−
−= mr
SS
rm
onI
s )()1(
ln
)1(
1)( θθλθλθτ                               (19) 
Condition (C.2) guarantees that the above quantity is positive. 
The intertemporal informational rent of the firm is strictly decreasing because 
0))(,()(' <−=−= − τθ θτθθ mreVIU , and since 0)( =θIU , then θθ ∀≥ ,0)(IU . 
The second order local condition of the revelation problem of the firm, given by (9), 
is verified because ( ) 0)( ' >θτ Is  and 0<θτV . 
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To verify the global optimality of the revelation problem of the firm, we consider the 
difference: 
[ ]
[ ] ∫ −=−=
−−−=Δ
θ
θ τ
θ
θ τθττθ
θτθθθτθθ
ˆˆ ))(,()(')('))(,()(
))ˆ(,()ˆ())(,()(
dyyVyygyVyg
VgVg
 
Using equation (7): 
∫ ∫∫
∫
=−=
−=Δ
θ
θ θ θτ
θ
θ ττ
θ
θ ττ
τττθττ
τθτττ
ˆˆ
ˆ
))(,()('))](,())(,()[('
))(,()('))(,()('
y
dydzyzVydyyVyyVy
dyyVyyyVy
 
Since ( ) 0)(' >yIsτ  and 0<θτV , then Δ>0, which means that the firm gets a higher 
intertemporal net profit when it announces the true value of its private information. 
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